1.1 Introduction
Gulf crisis began in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and ended in 1991 when a coalition of countries led by the United States expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait and destroyed much of Iraq's military capability. The brief war fought in 1991 between Iraq and United Nations allies to free Kuwait from occupying Iraqi forces. One of several wars fought at the Persian Gulf in the 90s (Yourdictionary, 2021). It was the first major international crisis of the post-Cold War era, and the U.S. led response would set important precedents for the use of military force over subsequent decades (Britannica, 2021).
As a prelude to other parts of this study, this chapter will discuss the background upon which this study was initiated, the statement of problems that led to this study, the Aim and Objectives of the study. Others are Significance of the study, Scope of work, Research hypothesis and questions, Limitations of the Study and Definition of technical terms.
1.2 Background of Study
In recent years, the planners of peace had to contrive some scheme to meet this demand, and they scurried about rather frantically trying to make reason match emotion. The League of Nations (a poetic rather than an accurate title, for nation is not a political term) was a mystical symbol born of the shattering experience of 1914-18, with little to do with logic. But it soon acquired great intellectual respectability, and the world has been struggling to make it practical ever since. It has had, indeed, a remarkable sanctity, criticism of it being almost an act of impiety in the United States.
"Emotion, not intellect, is the dynamic of history," as H. N. Brailsford has observed. Of the great ideas which have captured men's imaginations, in the modern democratic age at least, most have arisen from some urgent emotional need, not from a strictly rational analysis. This was remarkably true of the new concept of international relations that emerged from Versailles in 1919. The idea of collective security certainly did not come from the more experienced diplomats and statesmen, who were in the main quite sceptical about it. It came from journalists, moralists, popular politicians, from " the people "; it responded to a cry of protest against the intolerable existence of world war and a demand for reassurance that such wars be not permitted to happen again. This popular and unsophisticated call for the abolition of war insistently required some visible sign of a wholly new spirit.
This mystical emotion came mostly from the Anglo-Saxon peoples. There was a certain enthusiasm in France, but too much method could be detected in the French madness. Italy contributed little to the League except a very curious plan which indicated how differently a "proletarian" nation, as Italy called herself, looked at the problem: the new international organization should be a device for redistributing the good things of the earth. The defeated powers did not count, and Russia was disqualified. Yet if the League be-longed primarily to Britain and America, to men like Wilson and Bryce and Smuts, all the world felt in some degree the spiritual need to assail the no longer tolerable notion that wars are inevitable. A considerable background of such thinking may be found in almost every country.' No one had in mind a super-state. Nationalism was disposal of the new international organization, while all states dis-armed; he agreed with his advisers that this was, on sober reflection, "unconstitutional and also impossible."2 Herbert Hoover had al-ready announced that the United States Government " will not agree to any program that even looks like inter-Allied control of our re-sources after peace "-this in response to a suggestion for an inter-national relief organization, and Hoover's reason was that this would not secure "proper appreciation" of American contributions. If America could not be altruistic, how much less the hate-ridden peoples of Europe. A world government, the abolition of national states, was out of the question. The war had increased nationalism almost everywhere. There was a good deal of loose talk about the evils of "selfish nationalism," but no really international spirit existed, and no one explained how you could have nationalism without it being selfish-indeed, no one recognized his own nationalism as selfish at all. Yet the people did want first assurance that war would be put in the way of elimination. It was strongly if vaguely held that something had been terribly wrong about the old system, or lack of it. A symbol of hope had to be created. Hastily constructed, the League of Nations was established with due solemnity:
"The tents have been struck," said General Smuts, "and the great caravan of humanity is once again on the march." But whither it was marching was unfortunately not very clear. The League was supposed to embody some wholly new formula for rendering war obsolete. The phrase was Collective Security. It has never been a clear idea, and those who remain its enthusiastic supporters still confess that they do not know what it means.3 The League of Nations subsequently "failed," war was not prevented. That the idea behind it has nevertheless not only survived but even gained strength may be a tribute to the desperate plight of the world-faute de mieux. Or it may only be a tribute to the force of a mystique, to the astonishing ability of the modern masses to engage in slogan-thinking, and to the weakness of reason when confronted with terrible fears and earnest hopes. In any case the logical weaknesses in the idea deserve to be reviewed more often than they have.
Therefore, in Nigeria where the research was carried out, the activities that was conducted is to know the Principle of Collective Security of United Nation (UN) and the Gulf Crisis, 1990-1999.
1.3 Statement of Problems
Investigation revealed the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was, by any standards, one of the more significant international crises of the post-1945 epoch.1 It involved the mobilization of around one million armed men, the diplomatic involvement of much of the international community, and a war that, for all its limited character, was a significant case of inter-state conflict. In what follows we do not want to begin with the actual course of this war or to examine in detail specific aspects of the history, not least because the broad outline of what happened is already well known.2 I do, however, want to look at this conflict in broader perspective, and from two vantage points in particular, each pertinent to the study of international relations (IR).
1.4 Aim and Objectives of Study
The aim of the study is to examine the Principle of Collective Security of United Nation (UN) and the Gulf Crisis, 1990-1999. In achieving this aim, the following specific objectives were laid out as follows:
- To determine the significance of the UN Gulf crisis.
- To determine the place of principle of collective security in the UN Gulf crisis.
- To determine the implications of the UN Gulf crisis for the study of International Relations.
1.5 Research Questions
The study came up with research questions so as to be able to ascertain the above stated objectives. The specific research questions for the study are stated below as follows:
- What is the significance of the UN and the Gulf crisis?
- What role did the Principle of Collective security play in the crisis?
- What are the implications of the Gulf crisis for the study of International Crisis?
1.6 Research Hypothesis
In order to pursue the objective of this study, the following generalized statements have been designed to guide and aids in obtaining the result for the experiment to be conducted. For this work, the null hypothesis will be represented with H0 while the alternative hypothesis will be represented with hypothesis H1.
Hypothesis One
- H0: There is no significant relationship between the United Nation and the Gulf crisis
- H1: There is a significant relationship between the United Nation and the Gulf crisis
1.7 Significance of Study
The study seeks to establish history as to the causes and role of the UN in the Gulf crisis. The significance is to inform the reading public on some facts they probably may have less information on. Furthermore, the study is a contribution to academics.
This study will be of immense benefit to other researchers who intend to know more on this study and can also be used by non-researchers to build more on their research work. This study contributes to knowledge and could serve as a guide for other study.
1.8 Scope of Study
The scope of the research is focused on the Principle of Collective Security of United Nation (UN) and the Gulf Crisis, 1990-1999. This study is intended to be detailed enough to establish the complexities between the UN and the Gulf crisis. An in-depth look at the principle of collective security is as well a top priority which this study upholds.
1.9 Limitations of the Study
During the course of this study, many things militated against its completion, some of which are:
- Time Constraint: The time frame given to accomplish this project was very short due to school academic calendar and it was carried out under pressure which made the researcher not to implement some necessary features.
- Research material: availability of research material is a major setback to the scope of the study.
- Frequent power failure: This made the researcher append more money on fuel to ensure sustainable power.
- Financial Constraint: Insufficient fund tends to impede the efficiency of the researcher in sourcing for the relevant materials, literature or information and in the process of data collection (internet).
