Introduction
1.1. Background
The chief foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, I say, therefore, that the arms by which a prince defends his possessions are either his own, or else mercenaries, or auxiliaries or mixed (Machiavelli, 1952:72). The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if any one supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly among enemies, they have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men (ibid.). The arrival of private military companies (PMCs) onto the international stage in the early 1990s suddenly made the question of what a mercenary was − and whether or not the world ought to be concerned − important once more (Percy, 2003).
The debate on the use of private security providers and services in Africa's conflicts and post-conflict situations has in the last decade grown in prominence within the broad field of security studies (Gumedze, 2009:1). This has also tremendously shaped the thinking of international lawyers as the involvement of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in African conflicts has had a significant impact on conflict resolution, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) (ibid., 2009). As conflicts continue to be more complex in many countries around the world, the use of PMSCs has also increased. The privatization of security has now become a global phenomenon. From the beginning of the 21st century the world has witnessed an accelerated breakdown of the nation-state's monopoly on violence, and the emergence of marketplace purveyors of armed forces (ibid., 2009:1; Shcreier and Caparini 2005).
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